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24 and the Efficacy of Torture
By
M. D. Semel
Department of Criminal Justice
Sacred Heart University

In the Fox Television Network program 24 a fictional counterterrorism agent named Jack Bauer
uses extreme measures, including torture, to save the United States from catastrophic terrorist
attacks. Bauer uses torture even though its efficacy is in question and it is illegal. Political
leaders, including President George Bush, have endorsed the use of torture and Bauer's fictional
success has reinforced that the idea these methods are both necessary and effective in obtaining
actionable intelligence. This paper examines existing literature on military interrogations in the
context of 24 and reviews empirical and descriptive evidence about existing practices. While
researchers cannot ethically or legally test torture's effectiveness, more research is needed to
study methods currently in use by the military.
Keywords: counterterrorism, television, 24, interrogations
INTRODUCTION
Counterterrorism agent Jack Bauer, the chief protagonist in the Fox Television Network
series 24 rarely holds back when trying to extract information from a suspected or confirmed
terrorist or to protect the United States from disaster (Surnow, 2003). Over the course of his
television career, the fictional federal agent breaks a drug lord out of a federal prison, causing a
riot and the death of at least one corrections officer. He assaults and seriously injures his partner
to protect his undercover operation. He shoots and kills a known terrorist, even though she is no
longer a threat. He interrogates a suspected terrorist while his partner cuts the suspect’s wrist. He
fights heroin addiction after using the drug to convince drug cartel members that he has joined
them. Again, to protect his cover, he points a gun at his partner’s head and squeezes the trigger,
guessing, correctly, that the gun is not loaded. He tells a potential source of information that she
will be sent to a foreign country for interrogation where her constitutional rights do not apply. He
points a gun at a military pilot and orders the pilot to stay on course after the pilot has been given
orders to turn the plane around. In an interrogation room, he fires a gun at an interrogation
subject. All of these events occur in less than twenty-four hours during Season Three of the
show.
Season after season, Bauer averts the country from disaster of apocalyptic proportions
with derring-do and tactics that almost certainly violate U.S. and international law. And, he gets
results, often electing to use torture as his primary method of interrogation despite the fact that
torture violates U.S. and international law and its efficacy is in question. Instead of inspiring a
national discussion about the most effective ways to gather intelligence, 24 and its fictional
protagonist have become models of an effective counterterrorism strategy. It is not clear what
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interrogation methods are effective to gather accurate and actionable intelligence. This paper will
survey the extant research about military interrogations and examine what seems to be effective
and ineffective in current practices. A lack of empirical knowledge has allowed shows like 24 to
seduce viewers into believing that there is a simple and effective way to deal with the complex
problem of fighting terror.
On 24 Bauer's success comes in several forms. When Bauer tortures or threatens
suspects, he usually obtains at least some of the information he needs and, by the end of each
season, the threatened catastrophic attack is averted. The show is a commercial hit. Millions of
people watch 24. The show has generated fan clubs and web sites devoted to arcane information
about the character and the counterterrorism unit for which he works (e.g. www.24archive.com).
The character "Jack Bauer" has seeped into the consciousness of many Americans. He has
become a cultural icon and, in some cases, the model of an effective counterterrorism agent. The
Heritage Foundation, a Washington D.C. think tank, sponsored a forum about the image of the
United States in its fight against terrorism, featuring both the Secretary of Homeland Security
and actors from 24 (Farhi, 2006). According to Farhi, the secretary "praised" Jack Bauer's
"character" and "tenacity" and indicated that the "perseverance" displayed by both he and his
fictional colleagues "will help America defeat terrorism." At other times, both former president
Bill Clinton (McAuliff, 2007) and Associate Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia (Berlow,
2008) have referred approvingly to Bauer and his practices. For many Americans, including
members of the political elite, Jack Bauer embodies the real men and women who toil
anonymously in the nation's counterterrorism agencies.
Bauer’s fictional success has not gone unnoticed. Some members of the military have
expressed concern about its message. Brigadier General Patrick Finnegan, an instructor at the
United States Military Academy at West Point, traveled to Hollywood to convince the producers
of 24 to air a show where “torture backfires” (Regan, 2007; Mayer, 2007). According to Mayer,
Joe Navarro, a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) expert on interrogations who accompanied
Finnegan on the trip, asserted that a federal agent like Bauer is the type of agent that should not
be “in your organization."
The visual style of 24 where the action transpires in real time and a pounding digital
timer marks commercial breaks, may make it difficult for some viewers to determine if they are
watching "live," unfolding events or fiction, particularly children and adolescents. Each season
portrays a march toward a potentially catastrophic terrorist attack, not unlike the attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon. At the end of twenty-four hours of 24 however, the
United States prevails, and it prevails in part because the fictionalized hero of the series, Jack
Bauer, uses many of the same tactics as the bad guys, including torture. He uses torture in spite
of the fact that its efficacy and its legality are in doubt. The message? We need more of "this
type of agent."
Viewers of 24 may well reason that if Bauer uses it and the president authorizes it, torture
must be effective at producing intelligence. During Season Three of 24 President David Palmer
defers to Bauer's judgment when such hard decisions need to be made. Unlike the fictional
president, Bauer does not equivocate or internally debate the choices he must make. Viewers
learn that when extracting intelligence, torture is Bauer's method of choice. Torture proves itself
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successful for Bauer under a variety of circumstances, regardless of the subject and despite its
illegality and the absence of empirical support for its use.
MILTARY INVESTIGATIONS
While some policy makers and members of the public support the extreme measures used
by Bauer, no empirical support exists to show they produce accurate intelligence. Social
scientists cannot test harsh techniques or practices that amount to torture in an experimental
setting; such an experiment would be both illegal and in violation of ethical constraints imposed
on researchers. The only evidence about the effectiveness of torture, the act of inflicting severe
mental or physical pain on someone to force them to do or say something, comes from those who
were tortured and recount their experiences or from torturers themselves.
Studying techniques currently used by military intelligence and federal agents presents its
own difficulties and challenges. These challenges include security issues, access to samples of
interrogators, and the reliability and validity of the results obtained. The United States Army, the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation are unlikely to
formally allow researchers access to their personnel, both to protect both their agents and the
interrogation techniques they use. Interrogators may also be reluctant to submit to surveys or
interviews for fear of liability, or they may answer questions falsely for similar reasons,
particularly at a time when human rights groups and others have accused the U.S. of using
torture to gather intelligence (e.g. Malinowski, 2007), in violation of U.S. and international law
(Its prohibition is implicit in the Military Code of Conduct.)
Methods employed by the United States to procure intelligence from human subjects
have undergone increasing attention since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the year 24 debuted
on network television. The process of obtaining intelligence from captured subjects is known in
the military as human intelligence collection (HUMINT) and the practice has garnered
unprecedented examination and review (Sappenfield, 2005). There is self-reported, official, and
anecdotal evidence of practices and procedures approved for use by the United States military
(e.g. U.S. Army Intelligence and Interrogation Handbook, 2005). There are also reports that
describe techniques actually used in the field (e.g. Mackey & Miller, 2005), including torture
(e.g. Lagouranis, T. & Mikaelian A., 2007). It is unclear how wide-spread the use of torture is in
HUMINT. There are no published studies from open sources that empirically test the procedures
currently approved by the United States military. There are also no studies that survey experts in
the field to determine what they believe are the most effective methods for educing actionable
intelligence. The National Defense Intelligence College (2006) drew the same conclusions. A
thorough review of the literature since 2006 by this writer found the same result. While there is a
substantial body of research about interrogations in the law enforcement setting, there is no
empirical evidence that this research is valid in the military context.
The Army Handbook describes a number of approaches interrogators should employ
when interrogating prisoners, although not specifically terrorists. It suggests a military variation
on the "good cop-bad cop" routine as well as unique strategies such as "fear up harsh," which is
designed to exploit a prisoner's fears and intimate that the interrogator is the "way out of a trap."
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The "fear up harsh approach" also allows the interrogator to yell and throw items in the
interrogation booth. The Handbook cites no empirical support for its methods.
DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE OF U.S. INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES
News reports and human rights organizations have reported practices that they argue are
contrary to United States and international law. For example, in 2004, evidence surfaced that
U.S. military police personnel had tortured, humiliated, and, in at least one case, murdered
prisoners in their custody at the infamous Abu Ghraib prison in Bagdad. While the most
notorious incidents were not committed during interrogations, some allege that U.S. personnel
did use harsh interrogation techniques when questioning subjects at the prison (Conason, 2004),
and it is possible that prisoners died later from injuries sustained during interrogations. Also in
2004, Human Rights Watch issued a report, “Enduring Freedom: Abuses by U.S. Forces in
Afghanistan,” that accuses American troops of routinely abusing detainees held in U.S. custody
at Bagram Airbase and other facilities, sometimes during interrogations (Human Rights Watch,
2004).
Critics of U.S. policy charge that the CIA had secret prisons called “black sites” where
prisoners were tortured in order to extract information (Benjamin, 2007; Grey, 2007). At the
United States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, some prisoners held there and classified as
“unlawful combatants” accuse American interrogators of using techniques to gather information
that violate U.S. and international law (Beeg, 2006; Kurnaz, 2008). Beeg and Kurnaz also
document abuses of other prisoners they observed while held at Guantanamo. Private
interrogators, hired in contravention of U.S. military policy, have also been accused of abuses at
Abu Ghraib and elsewhere (Cushman, 2004). (See AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib
Prison and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade and AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib
Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, 2004, collectively entitled
Investigation of Intelligence Activities at Abu Ghraib, both report the result of investigations into
the incidents at Abu Ghraib conducted by the United States military. See also the Independent
Panel to Review Department of Defense Detention Operations, 2004, the published results of an
independent review.)
In conjunction with the advent of military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the
opening of Guantanamo Bay prison and increased covert action by the CIA, there are now a
number of sources for descriptive evidence of interrogation techniques used after the attacks of
September 11, 2001. Mackey and Miller (2004) write about Mackey's service as a military
interrogator in Afghanistan, Saar (2005) describes his tenure as military interpreter and
intelligence soldier at Guantanamo Bay, Holton (2005) discusses his role as a military
interrogator in Iraq, and Lagouranis (2007) also writes about his service as a military
interrogator, in Iraq. Mackey's recounting is relatively benign while Saar, McKelvey (2007), and
Lagouranis tell of questionable practices, including torture, that they insist were the norm, not
the exception. Holton does not give an in depth account of his role as an interrogator but
generally characterizes his activities as in accordance with appropriate guidelines and methods.
With the exception of McKelvey, the other books are first-person accounts of military
interrogators; McKelvey interviewed military personnel as well as former prisoners and their
families.
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McKelvey's book, Monstering, takes its name from a technique used by military
interrogators to "break" an uncooperative subject and Mackey (2004) describes the practice in
detail. He and other interrogators believed that if interrogator and prisoner were subject to the
same conditions, including sleep deprivation, a marathon interrogation session would not run
afoul of army regulations, U.S., or international law. The practice was used sparingly, according
to Mackey, and required interrogator and subject to remain awake in the interrogation booth until
the subject began to cooperate; one session lasted 29 hours. McKelvey describes monstering, as
practiced in Iraq, to be a form of torture that used teams of interrogators, loud noises, and
environmental controls, among other things. While interrogators needed to formally request the
ability to use these "harsh" techniques, she quotes one soldier who said "'I never saw a sheet
unsigned.'" (160)
Begg (2006), a British citizen of Pakistani descent, describes his imprisonment and
interrogations in Afghanistan and at Guantanamo Bay, which included torture. Kurnaz (2008), a
Turkish citizen, recounts his five years at Guantanamo where he also says he was subjected to
torture. Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen of Syrian descent, has widely described how he was
arrested by American authorities and sent to Syria where he was tortured, (e.g. Feuer, 2007), and
numerous newspaper and magazine articles published similar allegations. (e.g. Shane, Johnston,
& Risen, 2007; Human Rights Watch, 2004; Schmitt, 2006.)
A number of anecdotal reports describe the interrogations of Al Qaeda lieutenant Abu
Zabaydah. Posner (2003) writes that FBI officials believed their more humane efforts yielded
good information while more aggressive questioning by CIA operatives did not. Posner recounts
some of the details of the Zabaydah interrogation, which included the use of sodium pentathol, to
loosen up the Bin Laden aide. The tapes of the interrogation and their destruction are now the
subject of investigations by Congress and a federal prosecutor (Mazzetti & Johnston, 2008)
According to Eban (2007), when Zabaydah was captured after a "firefight," he was a "mess,"
having been shot in the groin. When Zabaydah was medically stabilized, FBI agents began their
"rapport building" approach with the prisoner and were beginning to gather useful information.
The CIA then took custody of Zabaydah and instituted "harsh" techniques authorized by the
president (e.g. Eggen & Pincus, 2007; Johnston, 2008).
Bowden (2003) discusses the interrogation of Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the alleged
mastermind of the September 11th 2001 attacks and another of Al Qaeda's key members.
According to Bowden, the CIA subjected Mohammed to waterboarding, isolation, environmental
manipulation, loud noises, continual light, stress positions, drugs, sleep deprivation, hooding, and
hunger, among other methods. He was told that his family was in custody and their status and
safety depended upon his cooperation, a tactic used by Jack Bauer during an interrogation. In
Bauer's case, however, he stages the execution of the subject's child to secure cooperation.
Unnamed CIA officials said Mohammed began to talk after 90 seconds of waterboarding,
(White, 2007), although some in the FBI doubt the value of the information he may have
provided or that he could survive that length of time under such conditions (White). In 90
seconds, about 1.2 gallons of water would have been poured down Mohammed's throat (White,
2007).
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LESSONS FROM LAW ENFORCEMENT: ISOLATION, RAPPORT, AND FEAR
Although no significant social science research has tested military and counterterrorism
interrogation techniques, social scientists have studied law enforcement techniques for a number
of years and a large body of empirical and descriptive literature exists (e.g. Gudjonsson, 2003;
Kassin, 2007; Leo, 1992; Virj, 2000). The law enforcement literature has dispelled many myths
about police interrogation techniques, such as police officers' confidence in their ability to detect
deception. It has helped to highlight more reliable practices. While the goal of counterterrorism
interrogations differ from those in law enforcement, military techniques and those of other
agencies are based in part on a law enforcement model and personnel may be subject to the same
myths that affect police interrogators. One set of myths is the efficacy of the practices used by a
fictionalized counterterrorism agent on a television series.
Despite the differences between law enforcement and the military, there is some overlap
in techniques and beliefs. Three methods currently endorsed by the military as effective share
themes with law enforcement practices: isolation, fear, and rapport. These three practices are also
endorsed by much of the current descriptive literature (Lagouranis, 2007; Mackey & Miller
2004).
Both military interrogators and those from law enforcement advance the idea that some
form of isolation can induce cooperation in a subject. Police officers generally have sought to
isolate a suspect from family, friends, and lawyers in the belief that outside parties will convince
the suspect not to talk. Military interrogators use more extreme forms of isolation, sometimes
reducing the prisoner's human contact and environmental stimulation to almost zero. They hope
that the interrogator will become the focus for the prisoner's desire for human interaction. Law
enforcement officers generate fear or anxiety in a suspect by subtlety implying they know more
about the case than they actually do or by overstating the quantity and quality of the evidence. A
POW's fear of the unknown, based on his ignorance about his captors or worry about his
treatment, is believed to increase his anxiety and, as a result, lead to his cooperation, especially if
he believes he might be transferred to another country for questioning. Perhaps most importantly,
both police and military interrogations accept the idea, even if in differing degrees, that
connecting with a subject in some way and building rapport make for a successful result (e.g.
Eban, 2007; Richey, 2007).
In their survey of the law enforcement literature to date, Neuman and Serrano (2005) find
that there is no empirical support for these three common techniques in spite of their wide-spread
use by police officers and military interrogators. According to Neuman and Serrano, the only
factor positively correlated with obtaining a confession is the length of an interrogation: the
longer the questioning, the more likely police will wear down the suspect and extract a
confession or inculpatory information. In 24 where time is always of the essence, torture or the
threat of torture often produces quick results.
The fictional Jack Bauer's primary weapon is fear: fear of death or great bodily injury
unless the prisoner cooperates and provides information. The show's conceit, real time action
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with a favorable resolution in twenty-four hours, adds to its seeming authenticity. In turn, policy
makers, presidential candidates, and politicians refer to the fictional Jack Bauer (and his tactics)
with admiration. Political leaders connect the fiction of 24 with the reality of the global battle
against terrorism, a reality that offers no easy answers and is not resolved in twenty-four hours.
This precarious, ever-evolving relationship between torture as depicted by Hollywood and the
actual horrors of an Abu Ghraib neutralizes torture's possible costs and falsely offers it as an
antidote to the fear and helplessness set in motion by the attacks of September 11, 2001. Unleash
Bauer and all that he stands for, the show and some political leaders tell us, surrender to "the
dark side" and the battle will be won, in twenty-four hours, minus commercials.
TORTURE’S EFFECTIVENESS
It is unlikely that leaders of democratic countries, like President Bush, would authorize
harsh practices and torture unless they believed such practices work and are appropriate, at least
for some prisoners. The judiciary of one democratic country, Israel, decided that the
effectiveness issue was moot in light of the high cost of using questionable practices. In 1999,
the Israeli Supreme Court issued an opinion that outlawed torture even in the “ticking time
bomb” scenario (Judgment on the interrogation methods applied by the GSS, 1999). In that
opinion, Justice Aharon Barak wrote that while a “democracy must sometimes fight with one
hand tied behind its back, it none-the-less has the upper hand” (23). This decision was probably,
in part, a response to sharp international criticism of Israel’s security agencies. It also likely
reflected soul-searching on the part of Israeli political leaders that the value of information
obtained by torture was not worth international opprobrium.
There is a wide range of positions on the efficacy of torture or its use in general.
Greenberg (2006) reviews a number of positions from support to limited use to total ban. Debate
about the use of torture still avoids or ignores threshold issues that should be of concern to social
scientists and interrogators who operate in the field. These questions include: Does torture work?
Do harsh interrogation methods extract reliable actionable intelligence that could not be obtained
without it? Do the techniques currently authorized by the United States military and federal
agencies succeed in producing accurate, actionable information? What do the experts in the field
believe are the most effective methods for getting information? Is torture one of them?
The question of torture's efficacy may be hypothetically answered in a number of ways: it
works; it does not work; it only works with specific personality types; only certain types of
torture work. The use of what are called "harsh" techniques deepens the problem. To some, the
term "harsh methods" is a euphemism for torture (e.g. Claude & Weston, 2005). To others, the
term appears to describe practices that fall somewhere between torture and techniques formally
authorized for use by the United States military and other federal agencies such as the FBI or the
CIA. For example, Ross and Esposito (2005) write that the CIA exposed detainees to repeated
listenings of "The Slim Shady" album by Eminem, which made many nervous and anxious. Is
this torture?
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LAWS GOVERNING TORTURE
Torture has a number of definitions under U.S. and international law, and treaties to
which the United States is a signatory. In addition, all members of the United Nations, by virtue
of their membership, are bound by the United Nations Charter (Byers, 2005), including the
United States. The United Nations Charter does not specifically ban torture but implies its
prohibition in the document's Preamble. Byers argues that special, jus cogens rules,
internationally accepted principles of fundamental human rights, overrule conflicting treaty
provisions and include a ban on torture. The most universally accepted definition comes from the
United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment (Leavitt, 2004). The treaty, which has not been ratified by the United States
Senate, defines torture as follows:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed
or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or
for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official
or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising
only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions (1).
A number of federal laws also codify a definition of torture. For example, United States
Code, Title 18, chapter 113c, section 2340, (2004), makes it a federal crime to torture outside of
the U.S. and applies to citizens of the U.S. as well as torturers “present” on U.S. soil. Section
2340 defines torture as “an act committed under the color of law specifically designed to inflict
severe physical or mental pain or suffering…” The law goes on to define “severe mental or
physical suffering” as prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from…the intentional
infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering.” The use of drugs and
threats are also covered under the statute, as are “procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the
senses or personality…” According to a legal memo prepared for the White House, (Bybee,
2002) the law had not been applied in the context of interrogations, either military or law
enforcement. It is noteworthy that the federal law on torture requires that the action be
“specifically designed” to inflict the harm, which is not necessarily the case when questioning a
suspected terrorist.
Military personnel are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (2006) and,
although no specific provision of the code prohibits torture, a number of sections are applicable
to the use of violence during an interrogation. For example, Article 93 of the code sanctions
“cruelty and maltreatment” and Article 128 punishes “assault.” Article 93 states anyone who is
“guilty of cruelty toward, or oppression, or maltreatment of any person” is subject to courtmartial.
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TORTURE & RECENT LEGISLATION
After signing the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Title X of the Department of Defense
Authorization Bill, the president issued a signing statement, offering his interpretation of the act.
In that signing statement, the president wrote:
[T]he executive branch shall construe Title X in Division A of the act, relating to
detainees, in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to
supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with
the constitutional limitations on the judicial power which will assist in achieving the
shared objective of the Congress and the President, evidenced in Title X, of protecting the
American people from further terrorist attacks (1).
The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 outlaws torture and requires that all interrogations
comply with the new Army Field Manual 2-22.3 (FM), Human Intelligence Collector Operations
(2006), even those conducted at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and by the CIA. It became a certainty
when Congressional sponsors enlisted enough lawmakers to override a threatened presidential
veto (Savage, 2006). However, the signing statement also appears to free the president’s hand to
authorize more harsh techniques. An unnamed senior White House official seemed to confirm
this in comments to the Boston Globe.
Of course the president has the obligation to follow this law, [but] he also has the
obligation to defend and protect the country as the commander in chief, and he
will have to square those two responsibilities in each case…We are not expecting
that those two responsibilities will come into conflict, but it's possible that they
will (1).
If there were any doubt that many in the federal government wanted the president to have
the discretion to approve techniques he believes are necessary to protect the United States, that
doubt was erased when Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (2006). The
Military Commissions Act of 2006 states that individuals whom the president designates as
“enemy combatants” do not fall within the protections of Article III of the Geneva Conventions,
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1950), and, therefore, are subject to interrogation
techniques deemed appropriate by the president, including conceivably, torture (The New York
Times, editorial, September 28, 2006). The New York Times called the law “our generation’s
version of the Alien and Sedition Acts.”
It is tempting to think that in today’s conflicts, some of which are perceived to be without
rules, fictional characters such as Bauer, who on television saves the United States each season
in twenty-four hours, are models of how to protect us. Bauer’s frequent success on television
using extreme measures can create an illusion that such measures are appropriate and that they
work better or more quickly than practices that fall within the constraints U.S. and international
law. As Mayer (2007) writes:
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[F]or all its fictional liberties, '24' depicts the fight against Islamist extremism much as
the Bush Administration has defined it: as an all-consuming struggle for America’s
survival that demands the toughest of tactics. Not long after September 11th, VicePresident Dick Cheney alluded vaguely to the fact that America must begin working
through the 'dark side' in countering terrorism. On '24,' the dark side is on full view...
[Joel] Surnow, the show’s executive producer and co-creator, who has jokingly called
himself a 'right-wing nut job,' shares his show’s hard-line perspective. Speaking of
torture, he said, “Isn’t it obvious that if there was a nuke in New York City that was
about to blow—or any other city in this country—that, even if you were going to go to
jail, it would be the right thing to do (1)?
Mayer adds that according to David Danzig, the project director of Human Rights First,
the "‘torturers have changed. It used to be almost exclusively the villains who tortured. Today
torture is often perpetrated by the heroes,’” including fictional heroes like Jack Bauer. It is also
the case that real policy makers are publically endorsing counterterrorism practices created in
Hollywood and used by an actor who assumes the role of a fictitious government agent on
television.
HARSH TECHNIQUES
It is difficult to determine what constitutes a “harsh,” “high pressure,” or “enhanced”
technique. All of these terms have been used by political leaders when they have discussed how
to interrogate suspected terrorists, with perhaps “harsh” the most frequent term. For example, in
2004 the CIA suspended self-described “enhanced interrogation techniques” (Priest, 2004).
“Enhanced interrogation techniques,” according to an unnamed CIA official, are “stress
positions,” “light and noise bombardment,” “sleep deprivation,” denial of pain medication,” and
what Priest called “feigned drowning” or what has become known as waterboarding (Priest). All
of these techniques are currently prohibited by the U.S. military.
Human Rights First and Physicians Against Torture co-authored a report about the use of
enhanced by the CIA (2007) but their report did not specifically define the term. Despite this, the
report gives examples of “enhanced” techniques that include “water-boarding (sic), hitting,
induced hypothermia, and stress positions, total and long-term isolation, and constant
bombardment with loud music and flashing lights.” Their report emphasizes that tactics that do
not leave physical marks, like many of the “enhanced” techniques, are none-the-less torture and
in violation of U.S. and international law. Rejali (2007) calls this “clean torture” because of the
absence of marks and the fact that this treatment does not “fit” commonly held ideas about what
constitutes torture. Sullivan (2007) finds that the term “enhanced interrogation” comes from the
German Verscharfe Vernehmung, a phrase used in a 1937 Nazi interrogation methods memo that
suggests practices, similar to those endorsed by the CIA, to break uncooperative subjects.
To add to the confusion, a Washington Post article recounts the destruction of CIA
interrogation tapes depicting the questioning of two of Osama Bin Laden's reputed lieutenants
and the use of "harsh" interrogation methods (Pincus 2007). During the Republican presidential
candidate debate in South Carolina (Council on Foreign Relations, Republican Debate
Transcript, 2007), the candidates used a number of terms when discussing techniques that go
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beyond those formally authorized for use in interrogations, including “every method but torture,”
“enhanced interrogation techniques, “very high pressure techniques,” and, to “respond in a way
to make them [terrorists] fearful.” In response to the remarks of the other candidates,
Representative Ron Paul of Texas stated, “it’s interesting talking about torture here in that it’s
become enhanced interrogation techniques. It sounds like Newspeak (sic).” To Paul and many
others, the words “enhanced techniques” mean torture.
POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR HARSH TECHNIQUES
During the Republican presidential candidate debate referenced above, one of the debate
moderators, Brit Hume, posed the “ticking time bomb” scenario to the debaters, one he described
as “plausible.” (Council on Foreign Relations, South Carolina Republican Debate Transcript,
2007). He asked the panelists “how aggressively would you [sic] interrogate those being held at
Guantanamo Bay for information about where the next attack might occur?” This hypothetical
conundrum is offered by some as a situation in which even those opposed to torture would
concede that all necessary means must be used to gain information that could save thousands or
more from a catastrophic attack (Greenberg, 2006). Dershowitz (2002) describes the hypothetical
as one in which a captured terrorist holds information about an "imminent attack" but refuses to
provide the information "necessary to prevent it." Experts consider it an unlikely series of events
(Greenberg).
At the debate, McCain responded to Hume's question first. The Arizona senator spent
over five years as a prisoner of the North Vietnamese and has acknowledged that he was tortured
(Santora, 2007). McCain said the hypothetical was unlikely, a “million-to-one,” and he ruled out
the use of torture in “999,999 of cases” (Council on Foreign Relations, Republican Debate
Transcript, 2007). Former New York City mayor Rudolph Giuliani, who later ended his
campaign, responded “I would tell the [interrogators] to use every method…It shouldn’t be
torture, but every method they can think of” (Brooks, 2007).
“Waterboarding" is a technique that is sometimes described as pouring water over the
face of a person who is restrained (Rejali, 2007) and was used by the CIA when agents
interrogated high level captives (e.g. Mazzetti; Mazzetti & Johnston). According to Rejali,
“waterboarding”, no matter how defined, is universally considered torture under U.S. and
international law. Recently, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights declared
waterboarding a form of torture (Rosenberg, 2008). When asked at the debate if this was
permissible, Giuliani answered “I would – and I would – well, I’d say every method they can
think of” (Brooks). Former Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney, who is no longer a candidate
for president, answered “not torture but enhanced interrogation techniques, yes” (Council on
Foreign Relations, Republican Debate Transcript, 2007). California Congressman Duncan
Hunter, a Vietnam combat veteran, said “I would say to [the Secretary of Defense], in terms of
getting information that would save American lives, even if it involves very high-pressure
techniques, one sentence: Get the information. Have it back within an hour, and let's act on it”
(Council on Foreign Relations, Republican Debate Transcript, 2007). Duncan has also ended his
campaign. Brooks writes that Colorado Congressman Tom Tancredo drew the largest applause
with his answer. “We’re wondering about whether water-boarding would be a - a bad thing to
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do? I’m looking for a Jack Bauer at that time, let me tell you” (Council on Foreign Relations,
Republican Debate Transcript, 2007).
When Tancredo endorsed the practices of a fictional counterterrorism agent as
appropriate policy, he illustrated how deeply 24 has penetrated the consciousness of Americans.
Nearly six years after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, strategies to fight
terrorism are created in Hollywood and sold to a public who may be unable to separate truth
from fiction or is too traumatized to care.
Bauer is a model counterterrorism agent to Tancredo and many other Americans, in part,
because he never agonizes over his decision to torture or break the rules. He acts decisively with
a clear goal: to save the United States from a catastrophic terrorist attack.
In the national debate over interrogation methods, 24 and its fictional protagonist have
convinced many viewers, including political leaders, that torture is a quick and efficient way to
gather intelligence, without moral ambiguity. In the end, Bauer's apparent success using torture
during interrogations distorts the available evidence from the field and offers a false paradigm
for a complex problem.
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